Congress and the Army have one chance to get Army Aviation right

As Congress considers major defense policy and spending bills this summer, it should start paying closer attention to an Army procurement program that is just getting off the ground: the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft, or FLRAA. If done right, the FLRAA helicopter, the successor to the venerable Black Hawk, will provide a revolutionary upgrade to the Army’s vertical lift capability in range, speed, agility and overall performance.  

Congress controls the purse strings and it has a vital role in oversight of the FLRAA program. The helicopter the Army selects must be affordable, producible and sustainable, and it must meet the operational needs of ground force commanders. The Army will choose a winner between the Sikorsky/Boeing team or Bell sometime in the next few months.  

How the Army measures and evaluates key attributes of the mission is vital. The long-range assault aircraft, first and foremost, must perform air assault operations. From my time as an Army Aviator, this means massing combat power — infantry, artillery, supplies — on the objective. That is the only way to achieve the element of surprise and overwhelm the foe. An air assault is not a single aircraft mission; it is a multi-aircraft mission that requires certain flight dynamics to maximize the number of aircraft in a landing zone. This equates to combat power, which is important to every infantryman on board.  

Speed, range and maneuverability also are important as the Army extends its operational reach in every theater. Speed must be evaluated at tactical altitudes. Against a near-peer threat, that is under 100 feet — quite different from counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, where missions were flown around 1,500 feet.  

Infrared and radar guided missiles are now the key threat. Flying very low allows a helicopter to mask in the “clutter” of terrain and avoid radar and line of sight. Maneuverability is also a critical component to mission performance and survivability, allowing helicopters with agility to support the ground force in and around the objective area, the most common scenario.  

The cost of the program is a key consideration and takes on many forms. Congress, specifically its defense committees and subcommittees, must ask questions that address both acquisition and total cost. This is something that is always mentioned but rarely addressed in a meaningful way. Failure to clearly examine costs up front results in everyone — Congress, the armed services, and taxpayers — paying more in time, effort and dollars. 

Total cost, at a minimum, includes training for pilots, mechanics and units, military construction costs, maintenance and operations. Total cost can negatively impact operations and doctrine in ways that are not intuitive but are real nevertheless. Ask the Marine Corps about unanticipated costs associated with fielding the V-22, for example. It took the Marines 20 years to work through the challenges and costs associated with changes to operations, training, infrastructure and employment. We would be foolish not to learn from this experience.  

A budget-constrained Army…